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WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN AFRICA: AN EXAMINATION OF 
AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
CEDAW AND THE UNIVERSALISM VERSUS CULTURAL 
RELATIVISM DEBATE.  
Bukola Faturoti* 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  Many African women suffer discrimination on the grounds of their gender 
and other factors, such as religion, customs, age and marital status. They continue to 
be victims of harmful practices whose perpetrators are never held to account because 
the practices have their roots in cultural values and traditions. Attempts to initiate a 
change in human rights especially in relation to women, is countered with the 
argument which rejects the imposition of Western culture on other regions of the 
world. This argument is based on the premises that human rights should be tailored to 
people’s cultural beliefs and therefore can never be universal. By comparing 
provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) and with examples of African human rights instruments, 
this article investigates the influence of cultural relativism, if any, on the formulation 
of women’s rights policies in African countries. 
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Introduction 
 
Behind the human rights discourse of various nations is often the accusation of the 
imposition of the Western values on other parts of the world.1 Some writers have 
concluded that the concept of human rights is a Western construct, and therefore does 
not apply to all nations.2 Shivji, for example, contends that human rights resulted in the 
                                                 
*Bukola Faturoti is a senior lecturer at the Law School, Aberdeen Business School, Robert Gordon 
University. The author would like to thank Prof Rebecca Wallace and other anonymous reviewers for 
their invaluable comments and feedback.  All remaining errors are those of the author. 
Email:b.faturoti@rgu.ac.uk     
1 Advisory Council on International Affairs (ACIA) (1998) Universality of Human Rights and Cultural 
Diversity,p10. Available from <http://www.aiv-
advies.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/AIV_04_Eng_titel.pdf>  (accessed on 16 May 2014) 
2 See Pollis, Adamantia (1979) ‘Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability’ in 
Pollis, Adamantia and Schwab, Peter (eds) Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives cited 
in Kufuor, KO (2010)The African Human Rights System: Origin and Evolution 1-18. 
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perpetuation of class differences.3 Furthermore, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) is regarded by some as universal only in name and not in content. This 
assertion is based on the argument that there was little African representation during its 
drafting,4 while both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which were drawn 
up in 1966 are a product of an imbalance of power between the negotiators.5  An 
historical assessment of human rights conventions shows that these conventions are 
archetypes of Western values.6 When the latter part of the twentieth century and the 
early twenty-first century witnessed the participation of African countries and other 
developing nations in the making of various international conventions, it was 
anticipated that those who oppose Western dominance would no longer be the objects 
of history, but the actual makers of history and policy.   
 
To assess the response of developing countries to alleged Western dominance, this 
article explores the relationship between the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discriminations against Women (CEDAW) and selected human rights 
systems in Africa as they affect women’s rights. African human rights systems exhibit 
a complex intersection of laws and organisations in Africa. Kufuor divides human rights 
systems into three broad groups. The first is a set of human rights which are found in 
specific charters, protocols, and human rights tribunals’ decisions and declarations. The 
second set consists of sub-regional, economically focused treaties that do not directly 
relate to the protection of human rights and the decisions of tribunals established under 
these treaties. Finally, the third set is municipal court decisions applying the provisions 
of the treaties.7  
 
The essence of international human rights law is to ensure uniformity in the protection 
of human rights.8 Thus, regional human rights systems are decried as heresy in 
realisation of universal human rights because they tend to embody the specific social 
                                                 
3 Shivji, IG(1989) The Concept of Human Rights in Africa 3 
4 Only Liberia, Egypt and Ethiopia participated in the drafting of the UDHR. 
5 Ogunbanjo, Martin Bimbo ‘Human Rights in Africa in the new Global Order: A Dilemma?’  African 
Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific 2003 Conference Proceedings - Africa on a Global 
Stage Available from <http://afsaap.org.au/assets/Ogunbanjo.pdf> (accessed on 16 December 2014).  
6 Ibid.  
7 Kufuor, KO (2010)The African Human Rights System: Origin and Evolution.   
8 Universal Declarations of Human Rights GA Res. 217A 3rd Session U.N. Doc A/810 (1948). 
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and cultural characteristics of a particular region.9 By their nature, regional human 
rights systems have the tendency to expand the gulf between the rights espoused by one 
state and those espoused by others.10 Does this regionalisation of human rights systems 
constitute a threat to the international protection of human rights? In other words, to 
what extent are African human rights systems in consonance with international human 
rights law, in relation to protection of women’s rights?  
 
Through analysis of the relevant normative aspects of African-authored human rights 
instruments, this article investigates whether human rights systems in Africa are 
designed to perpetuate the relativism argument, since African nationalists are part of 
the global campaigns against Western dominance and neo-imperialism.  The article 
reviews the human rights universalism-relativism debate and the quest for a 
convergence between the two sides, as a response to the actual reality in international 
in the context of human rights policies and instruments. The article suggests that it 
would be useful to explore a meeting point between relativism and universalism in order 
to eliminate the divergent viewpoints and suspicion surrounding the notion of human 
rights as a Western construct.   
 
The position on the human rights of women has been one of the areas in which the 
relativism-universalism debate is prominent. Using Africa as an example, many women 
are victims of inequalities which are justified on the ground of cultural values and 
traditions, which are embodied in uncodified customary law. There is no doubt that 
cultural traditions in some instances have complemented constitutional rights 
guarantees; however, they have also constituted a clog in the full enjoyment of human 
rights in other areas. This article therefore examines African regional and sub-regional 
instruments relating to the protection of women’s human rights by comparing these 
instruments to the provisions contained in CEDAW. It concludes that, irrespective of 
vociferous arguments for cultural relativism, African human rights systems have 
always been designed to be in tandem with other international conventions protecting 
women’s rights. This work builds on the existing literature examining the status of 
women’s rights in Africa by extending its coverage to sub-regional instruments.   
                                                 
9 Robbins, M (2005) “Powerful States, Customary Law and the Erosion of Human Rights through 
Regional Enforcement” 35 California Western Law Journal 275 – 302. 
10 Ibid.  
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Cultural relativism versus the universality of human rights: A quest for consensus 
 
Contentions about the content and applicability of human rights instruments represent 
another aspect of the universalism versus cultural relativism debate. These debates have 
evolved in the context of contrasts between North and South or liberal and conservative 
systems.11 Relativists were led by the American Anthropologist Association, which 
argued in 1947 against the UDHR’s applicability before its adoption. The Association 
contended that the UDHR should have contained a statement acknowledging the rights 
of men to live in terms of their own traditions12  because failure to do so this amounts 
to an excessive imposition of Western values on other cultures.13  This conclusion was 
rejected at the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, as the delegates believed 
that the universal nature of human rights was beyond question.14 Human rights, 
delegates concluded, are the birth right of all human beings. Delegates noted that 
different cultures of the world share many similarities and they all uphold fundamental 
principles and values.15 They stated that ‘all human rights are universal, indivisible, 
interdependent and interrelated’.16 Regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, governments have a responsibility to satisfy international obligations in 
accordance with international standards, including  human rights obligations.17 It is 
submitted that a denial of the universality of human rights is also a denial of human 
rights. Arguments based on cultural relativism should not be used to avoid or undermine 
human rights obligations. More importantly, cultural relativism should not be invoked 
to justify any act which infringes or denies others their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
 
                                                 
11 See for a detailed philosophical and theoretical discussion An-Na’im, AA ‘Problems of Universal 
Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights’ in An-Na’im, AA & Deng, F. (eds) (1990) Human Rights in 
Africa: Cross Cultural Perspectives; Donnelly, Jack (1984)‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human 
Rights’ 6(4)Human Rights Quarterly; Donnelly, Jack (2000) (2nd ed.) ‘Universal Human Rights in 
Theory and Practice. 
12Advisory Council on International Affairs (ACIA) (1998) Universality of Human Rights and Cultural 
Diversity at 10. 
13 Ibid. 
14 World Conference on Human Rights ‘Vienna Declaration and Action Programme’adopted in Vienna 
on 25 June 1993 Part I para. 1. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
17Beyani, Chaloka (1994) ‘Towards a More Effective Guarantee of Women’s Rights in the African 
Human Rights System’ in Cook, R (ed.) Human Rights of Women: National and International 
Perspectives 285.  
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What is cultural relativism? Cultural relativism asserts that human values vary 
according to different cultural perspectives.18 The presumption here is that rights and 
other social practices, values and moral rules are culturally determined. In other words, 
relativism rests on the notion of moral autonomy and communal self-determination. 
Culture is the principal source of the validity of a moral rule or right.19 A society’s 
norms and values are dictated by its culture.20 A homogenous society encompasses, by 
way of its sub-cultural groups, much heterogeneous behaviour.21 For example, the 
British culture consists of English, Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh cultures.  As 
these sub-cultural groups interact, the cultural differences become more pronounced.22  
 
Scholars in support of universalism contend that culture is irrelevant in the 
determination of human rights.23 Louis Henkin argued that ‘to call them human 
suggests that they are universal: they are the due of very human being in every human 
society. They do not differ with geography or history, culture or ideology, political or 
economic system, or stage of development.’24 In other words, everyone is entitled to 
human rights simply because one is human and the concept of human rights loses its 
value when not all people can lay equal claim to it. Donnelly concludes that cultural 
relativism is the argument of oppressors who want to perpetuate an unjust dynasty.25  
This author is of the view that the idea that there should be a contextual cultural 
approach is amorphous and prone to abuse. It will not only undermine the effectiveness 
of international law and the international system of human rights, but will also 
legitimise the violation of human rights; and act as a clog for constructive and genuine 
criticism of human right abuses.  
 
                                                 
18 Donnelly, Jack (1984)‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights’ 6(4)Human Rights Quarterly 
400. 
19 Ibid at 401. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Advisory Council on International Affairs (ACIA) (1998) Universality of Human Rights and 
Cultural Diversity at 9 
22 Ibid. 
23 Robbins, M (2005) “Powerful States, Customary Law and the Erosion of Human Rights through 
Regional Enforcement” 35 California Western Law Journal 275 
24 Henkin, Louis (1981) “Rights: Here and There” 81Columbia Law Review 1582. 
25 Donnelly, Jack (1984)‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights’ 6(4)Human Rights 
Quarterly 400. 
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The counterclaim of non-Western relativist scholars is that the prevalent human rights 
standard does not reflect their particular moral and cultural values.26 Using the UDHR 
as an example, African relativists claim that the three independent African countries, 
namely Liberia, Egypt and Ethiopia, which participated in the drafting, could not be 
said to have represented the interests of the entire African continent.27 Zvogbo contends 
that if the documents were to be re-drafted today, the content would be substantially 
different.28 First, the Western conception of human rights views the fundamental unit 
of society as that of the individual, in contrast to the communalism cherished in Africa. 
This Western notion of individualism hinders economic development and ongoing 
nation building in many African countries.  However, Zvogbo’s assertion does not 
provide guidance on the extent to which derogation from individual rights should be 
permitted to allow community rights. Second, the Western idea that the primary basis 
of securing human existence in society is through rights and not duties is not sustainable 
in Africa and other similar cultures. For example in the African context, one owes one’s 
community a variety of duties and these duties take precedence over one’s individual 
rights.29 The importance of these ideals is to strengthen community ties and social 
cohesion by ensuring patriotism on the part of the individual, who sees society as above 
him or herself and to strengthen the principle of reciprocity, which compels the 
community to safeguard the interests of the individual in return. Third, the primary 
method of securing these rights is through a process of legalism, where rights are 
claimed and adjudicated upon as against reconciliation, repentance and education.30  
 
An examination of the norms governing legal, political and social structures in the pre-
colonial African societies should not be misunderstood. The examination portrays an 
African concept of rights which supports group solidarity, communal well-being and a 
sufficient level of individualism.31 The Akan and Akamba societies are an example of 
                                                 
26 Banda, Fareda (2003) ‘Global Standards: Local Values’ 17 International Journal of Law, Policy and 
the Family 1–27. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Zvogbo, E. (1990) ‘A Third World View’ in Kommers, DP & Loescher, GD (eds) Human Rights and 
American Foreign Policy 90 -106.  
29 M'Baye, Keba (1987), "Organisation de L'Unite Africaine," in Vasal, Karel Les Dimensions 
International de Droits de L'Homme 651. 
30Shina, S (1981) ‘Human Rights: A Non Western View Point,’ Archiv für Recht und Sozialphilosophie, 
vol. 67, at 89-90 cited in Ibhawo, B (1999) Between Culture and Constitution: The Cultural Legitimacy 
of Human Rights in Nigeria. 
31  Ibhawo, B (1999) Between Culture and Constitution: The Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in 
Nigeria 20 
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this conception of human rights. The power over life and death was reserved for a few 
elders, who could only exercise it after an elaborate judicial procedure with appeals 
from one court to another; this power could be only invoked in murder and 
manslaughter cases.32  
  
The recent trend in the human rights discourse notes that the universalism versus 
cultural relativism debate has been exhausted. Asserting one position over the other is 
misleading; instead a common ground should be explored. According to Sousa Santos: 
‘[t]he debate is an inherently false debate...All cultures are relative, but cultural 
relativism as a philosophical posture is wrong. All cultures aspire to ultimate 
concerns and values, but cultural universalism as a philosophical posture is 
wrong.’33  
 
An objective examination shows that underlying the diversity of cultures are certain 
universally accepted values.34 It is advantageous to pursue a global concept of human 
rights, which is inclusive of all values of other cultures if human rights are to play an 
important role in the new world order. Scholars should neither gloss over the challenges 
of cultural relativism to the concept of the universality of human rights, nor accord 
prominence to it, but instead adopt a constructive approach that recognises the problems 
and addresses them in the context of different cultural traditions and across cultural 
boundaries.35 Failure to do so will diminish the prospects of developing truly universal 
standards of human rights and effective mechanisms for achieving them.36 While 
relativism is prone to legitimise human rights violations, universalism can also produce 
undue formalism or naïve idealism. 
 
The Bangkok Declaration of the Asian countries,37 while acknowledging that human 
rights are universal in nature, states that universality can only be valuable where 
                                                 
32 Wa Mutua, Makau (1995)‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation 
of the Language of Duties’ 35(2)Virginia Journal of International Law 339. 
33 Sousa Santos, B (2006) ‘Towards a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights’ in Isa, GF & Feyter , 
Koen de International Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges 58 
34 Ibhawo, B (1999) Between Culture and Constitution: The Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in 
Nigeria 22 
35 An-Na’im AA (1992) ‘Introduction’ in An-Na’im AA (ed) Human Rights in Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus 1- 15. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Bangkok Declarations as cited by Cerna, C (1994)  ‘Universality of Human Rights and Cultural 
Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in different Socio-Cultural Contexts’ 16 Human Rights 
Quarterly 740, 741. 
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regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds are 
considered.38  The Declaration appears to suggest that relativism is achievable within 
universality. A point which is not clear is how to accept cultural tolerance, without 
condoning the violation of women’s rights. Will a normative consensus not negate the 
universality of human rights? Possibly the quest for congruence is a lofty aspiration.  
 
Universalists, for example Beyani,39 suggest a radical approach in which cultural norms 
are sieved through a human rights filter. Where cultural norms fail this simple 
compatibility test, they must be jettisoned. Such a radical approach revisits the concept 
of the supremacy of universalism and this cannot be ignored. The problem with this 
suggestion is that where it does not enjoy the support of the people, it might be difficult 
to effect such changes. Stewart40 prefers an evolutionary approach that allows cultures 
to evolve and change with time. In other words, the processes of acculturation and 
globalisation will phase out discriminatory cultural trends. People’s views and beliefs 
will change as they interact with other cultures and perspectives. However, although 
true, an evolutionary approach is an oversimplification of the discourse because it does 
not take into consideration the imbalance of power within a society. Global events show 
that cultural institutions are deeply rooted and determine the time and pace of evolution, 
unless forcefully overthrown. In instances where the advocates of change do not have 
the necessary power and are unable to muster support both externally and internally, 
the evolutionary process becomes stifled. 
 
In conclusion, there is a danger in adopting an all-or-nothing approach regardding the 
relevance of culture to human rights, be it universalist or relativist. Rather ‘an 
intermediating relevance for both international law (standards, procedures, and 
implementation) and cultural hermeneutics’ might be the solution.41 Falk highlights the 
symbiotic relationship between the two. He explains that: 
‘[W]ithout mediating international human rights through the web of cultural 
circumstances, it will be impossible for human rights norms and practices to take deep 
                                                 
38 Ibid.   
39 Beyani, Chaloka (1994) ‘Towards a More Effective Guarantee of Women’s Rights in the African 
Human Rights System’ in Cook, R (ed.) Human Rights of Women: National and International 
Perspectives 285. 
40 Stewart, A (1993) ‘The Dilemmas of Law in Women’s Development’ in Adelman, S & Paliwala, A 
(eds)  Law and Crisis in the Third World 266. 
41 Faulk, Richard (1992)‘Cultural Foundations for  the International Protection of Human Rights’ pp 44-
64 in An-Na’im AA (ed) Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus  46 
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hole in non western societies except to the partial, often distorting…. At the same time, 
without cultural practice and tradition being tested against the norms of international 
human rights there will be a regressive disposition towards the retention of cruel, brutal, 
and exploitative aspects of religious and cultural tradition.’42  
 
An-Na’im suggests that Falk’s mediation will be realisable through an internal cultural 
discourse and a cross-cultural dialogue.43 The cross-cultural approach will demystify 
the underlying causes of the continuing divergence between the theory and practice of 
human rights. Human rights cannot be seen as truly universal unless they are conceived 
and articulated within the widest possible range of cultural traditions. The success of 
this approach can only be attained when it is mutual between cultures and sensitive to 
the needs of internal authenticity and legitimacy. However Howard44 is doubtful of the 
success of a cross-cultural dialogue and argues that human rights are a modern concept 
now universally applicable in principle. Human rights is a fashion borne out of the 
social evolution of the entire world toward state societies and to embark on a voyage of 
all known human cultures for consensus on rights is to confuse the concepts of rights, 
dignity and justice.    
 
To round off this section of this article, it is submitted that the debate of universalism 
versus cultural relativism of human rights will always be present. The issue might 
become even stronger in the context of continuing globalisation and the growing 
clamour for self-determination along cultural lines. World issues such as civil wars, 
terrorism and religious intolerance are manifestations of the new dimension to the 
debate. Each nation or cultural group must purge itself of rigid formalism and allows 
the flexibility needed for reciprocal concessions. While there were arguably ‘good old 
days’ there is also a better tomorrow. Nevertheless, cultural relativism should never be 
a justification for oppression or arbitrary rule in any form, but rather an expression of a 
genuine right to self-determination. 
 
 
                                                 
42 Ibid. at 45. 
43 An-Na’im AA, (1992)‘A Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of 
Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ in An-Na’im 
AA (ed) Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus 19 -43. 
44Howard, RE (1986)‘Dignity, Community, and Human Rights’, in An-Na’im AA (ed), Human Rights 
in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus 81-102.  
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Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discriminations against Women 
(CEDAW)  
 
Prior to the emergence of CEDAW, there were international attempts to address the 
inequality and discrimination meted to women.  CEDAW is a landmark treaty in the 
struggle for women’s rights45 as it represents a departure from the fragmentary 
approach of earlier instruments46 protecting women’s rights. CEDAW entered into 
force on 3 September 1981 upon ratification by the required 20 member states.47 As of 
June 2013, CEDAW has been affirmed by 187 states parties making it the second most 
widely ratified human rights treaty.48 
 
Written in a gender-neutral language, CEDAW has 30 articles contained in six uneven 
parts. Part I consists of arts 1– 6, which contain the definitions on discrimination and 
other fundamental edicts, states’ obligations,49 a provision on temporary special 
measures and a provision on the eradication of trafficking and exploitation of women. 
Part II focuses on equal participation of women in political and public life at both 
international and national levels, as well as on equal treatment in nationality law. 
Protection for the interests of rural women is contained in Part III in arts 10-14, which 
advocate measures that will ensure equality between the sexes in economic, social and 
cultural matters. Part IV provides for legal equality and in art16 addresses issues 
pertaining to marriage and family relations. Part V, which outlines the Convention 
mechanisms also establishes a twenty-three-member committee and a reporting system. 
Finally, Part VI contains provisions for revisions, entry into force and very importantly, 
                                                 
45 Maboreke, M (1991)‘Women and Law in Post-Independence Zimbabwe,’ in Bazilli, S (ed) Putting the 
Women on the Agenda 227. 
46 The Convention on the Political Rights of Women 1952; the Convention on Nationality of Married 
Women 1957;  and the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration 
of Marriage 1964 have been criticised for being too narrow in scope. 
47 For a detailed history, see <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm>  (Accessed on 
10 September 2013). 
48 African countries that have ratified CEDAW are Algeria, Angola, Benin,  Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
49 CEDAW art 2. 
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for reservations.50  Koskinen describes CEDAW as the International Bill of Women’s 
Rights.51 
 
 
CEDAW is built on the twin pillars of non-discrimination and equality. Article 1 of 
CEDAW provides a very broad definition of discrimination. This definition covers 
discriminations in the form of distinctions, exclusions and restrictions; it prohibits all 
guises of discrimination in all areas of life, either as an act of the state or by a private 
person or private organisation.  The definition outlaws both the de jure and de facto 
discrimination that may cause imbalances between the treatment of men and women in 
the society. Under the Convention, the CEDAW Committee explains that differential 
treatments on the basis of gender may constitute direct discrimination if it results in 
impairing or nullifying women’s rights.52 The Committee adds further that similar 
treatments which can impair or nullify women’s rights may lead to indirect 
discrimination.53 Indirect discrimination could arise from a neutral law, policy or 
programme in relation to men and women, which fails to address pre-existing 
inequalities.54 Discrimination against women will only be eradicated where both men 
and women are treated equally.55 However, no definition is given to the term ‘equality’. 
This non-inclusion in the definition has led to a myriad of conclusions which are at 
cross-purposes with the aim of CEDAW.56 It is not clear whether the focus should 
actually be on ‘equity’ instead of ‘equality’. Some scholars regard the terms as being 
synonymous, while others contest that equity is actually a mechanism through which 
equality can be achieved.57 Gómez Gómez, writing for the Pan American Health 
Organization, argues that inequality does not necessarily entail inequity. She concludes 
                                                 
50 I regard the allowance for reservation as part of efforts in mediating between international standards 
and local values as suggested by Falk and An-Na’im though this may not have been directly envisaged 
when it was drafted. This reservation is not a blank cheque because it has to be compatible with the 
‘object and purpose’ of CEDAW. Many states parties who entered reservations to particular provisions 
invoked various conflicts between their traditions and national laws. 
51 Koskinen, Paivi (2005) ‘To Own or to Be Owned: Women and Land Rights in Rural Tanzania’ in 
Scheinin, Martin & Suksi, Markku (eds): Human Rights in Development Yearbook: Empowerment, 
Participation, Accountability and Non-Discrimination: Operationalising a Human Rights-Based 
Approach to Development.  
52 UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/28, [16],General Recommendation 28,  
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55UN Doc A/59/38, annex I [4], General Recommendation 25,  
56 Jones, Karen L ‘Women’s National League: Does CEDAW go far enough?’ (2013) 13 International 
Sports Law Journal 35 - 44 
57 International Women’s Rights Action Watch – Asia Pacific 2009  CEDAW Available at 
<http://www.iwraw-ap.org/convention/doc/cedaw.pdf>  (accessed on 23 October 2013).  
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that ‘while equality is an empirical concept, equity represents an ethical imperative 
associated with the principles of social justice and human rights.’58 Both Facio and 
Morgan, on the other hand, disagree with Gómez Gómez’s conclusions.59 They are of 
the view that while both equity and equality focus on social justice, equity is never a 
concept associated with human rights. In addition, they maintain that equity is an 
unrealistic social goal which governments put forward when they have failed, while 
equality is a human rights obligation, to which they must comply.60  Simply put, the 
principle of equality is pivotal to human rights and human rights without equality would 
be meaningless.  
 
A close reading of the CEDAW text reveals three types of equality: formal equality, 
substantive equality and transformative equality.61 Formal equality focuses on the 
content of the laws and practices and their even-handed application. This is de jure 
equality, which demands that women and men should be treated the same. For example, 
states parties are required under art 7(a) to adopt measures that protect women from 
being disfranchised, either as voters or aspirants to political offices, while art 9 requires 
states parties to guarantee women the right to, by choice, change, acquire and retain 
their nationality without any fear of being rendered stateless by that decision.62 De facto 
or substantive equality requires states parties to ensure that women are given equal 
opportunities and to create an enabling environment which allows them to achieve 
equal result. Substantive equality addresses the effects of laws, policies and practices 
and aims to alleviate any inherent disadvantages a particular group may experience. 
Biological, social and cultural differences between men and women must be taken into 
account. For example, arts 3 and 24 respectively enjoin states parties to explore all 
possible measures to ensure the full development and advancement of women and full 
realisations of rights provided for in CEDAW.63 Under these articles, governments 
                                                 
58 Gómez Gómez, Elsa (2004) ‘Equity, Gender and Health: Myths and Realities’, Women’s Heath 
Journal 54 
59 Facio, Alda & Morgan, Martha (2009) ‘Equity or Equality for Women? Understanding CEDAW’s 
Equality Principles 60 Alabama Law Review 1133. 
60Ibid.  
61 Cusack, Simone & Lusey ,Lisa (2013)CEDAW and the Rights to Non-discrimination and Equality 14  
Melbourne Journal of International Law  1 – 39.2 
62 Byrnes, Andrew (2012) ‘Article 1’ in Freeman, Marsha A; Chinkin, Christine & Rudolf, Beate (eds), 
The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: A 
Commentary 51, 52. 
63 UN Doc A/59/38, annex I [10], General Recommendation 25. 
13 
 
must design and implement strategies which address the problems of under-
representation of women and redistribution of resources between men and women. 
Lastly, the dismantling of systemic inequalities and eradication of gender-based 
stereotypes is core to transformative equality.64 This form of equality imposes dual 
obligations on the states parties. First, there must be a review of institutions and societal 
structures which are being used to perpetuate inequality. Second, there must be 
modifications and transformation of norms, prejudices and stereotypes. Accordingly, 
under article 2(f) states parties are required to take appropriate measures to modify or 
abolish laws, regulations, customs and practices that discriminate against women. This 
would involve states parties adopting measures ‘towards a real transformation of 
opportunities, institutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded in 
historically determined male paradigms of power and life patterns’.65 
 
On discriminatory cultural practices, article 2 obligates states parties: ‘to take all 
appropriate measures,66 including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations customs and practices that constitute discrimination against women’.67 The 
Convention acknowledges that in reality outlawing discriminatory cultural or religious 
practices requires more than law. So the phrase ‘all appropriate measures’ means all 
reasonable means and efforts. These efforts may entail ‘invading’ the private sphere of 
life because this is where these violations thrive. This will require proactive action from 
state parties.  
 
For the elimination of all stereotypic attitudes that prejudice women, the states parties 
have the onus ‘to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, 
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the 
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women’.68  Articles 2 and 5 are a catalyst of 
women’s rights conceptions as they aim for a holistic transformation of society.  A state 
party violates its obligations under these articles where it either fails to address gender 
                                                 
64 UN Doc. CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011 (2014), Communication No. 34/2011. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Emphasis supplied. 
67CEDAW art.2(f). 
68Ibid art 5.  
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inequalities or perpetuates them through legislation, judicial pronouncements or 
customs.69 
 
It is, however, not surprising that the radical approach of CEDAW is also the obstacle 
to its implementation70 as many states parties have invoked the art 28(2) provision that 
allows reservations to express their relativistic views, provided they are not 
incompatible with the purpose of the Convention to express their relativistic views. For 
example, Egypt entered reservations to arts 2, 9 and 16, claiming that Islamic law had 
given women the necessary rights even before ratification of CEDAW.71 Lesotho, citing 
cultural reasons, said it would not take any legislative measures under CEDAW which 
were incompatible with its Constitution.72 A similar issue to that of reservation is the 
idea of making a treaty subject to national law. National laws change, because of 
positive or negative trends in governance; this jurisprudential restructuring makes it 
difficult to ascertain a state’s obligations.73  
 
The 1999 Optional Protocol to CEDAW74 permits individuals or organizations acting 
on their behalf to bring complaints to its Committee.75 The Committee is vested with 
the power under the Protocol to launch an inquiry if it has reason(s) to believe that grave 
systematic violations of women’s rights exist within a state.76 The inquiry processes 
can only be invoked where the membership of a state party still subsists. 
                                                 
69 Hossain, Sara (1994) ‘Equality in the Home: Women’s Rights and Personal Laws in South Asia’ in 
Cook, Rebecca J. (ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives 465-94. 
70 The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities expressed its 
concern that ‘[c]ertain reservations to the Convention, in particular, those in relation to the adoption of 
policies and institutional measures to implement the terms of the convention (art.2), political and public 
life (art.7), discrimination in the field of employment (art.11), equality of men and women before the law 
(art.15) and marriage and family relations (art.16), might diminish the international legal norms and 
legitimize its violations…’ See Report of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities on its forty-third session, Geneva, 5-30 Aug UN Doc E/CN4 Sub2/1991/65 of 
24 Oct 1991 145-146.    
71 Tomasevski, K Women and Human Rights p 124 citing The Report of the Committee on Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women, Vol. II Third Session, UN Doc A/39/45 (1984) para 215-16. 
72 <http://www.bayefsky.com/doc.php/area/reservations/state/97/node/3/treaty/cedaw/opt/0>  accessed 
on 13 July 2013. 
73 Clark, B (1991) ‘Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination 
Against Women’ 85 American Journal of International Law 281. 
74 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Eliminations of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women UNGA Res. 54/4, 6th October 1999 (‘Optional Protocol’). 
75 Optional Protocol to art 2 
76 Ibid. Arts 8, 9 and 10. 
15 
 
African human rights system 
 
Compared to their counterparts in the in most other parts of the world, African women 
suffer discrimination and violation of human rights which are justified by cultural and 
religious practices.77 Many women are victims of female circumcision, oppressive 
puberty rites, widowhood rites, forced marriages and the erosion of basic rights. African 
women’s access to human rights was captured in this way ‘If human rights begin with 
breakfast, a great majority of Africa’s residents go very hungry indeed. And within this 
group women and children suffer most’.78  
 
The cultural relativism versus universalism debate, as pointed out by Banda, is centred 
on the cultural justifications found in personal laws for discriminating against women.79 
This part of the article explores whether cultural relativism engineers a departure by 
African created human rights documents from international human rights standards 
rights. In other words, does the argument relating to the imposition of Western values 
influence the African continent in culturally structuring its human rights documents?80   
 
Beyani provides a guidance note on the complementary role of regional instruments. 
Regional instruments, he posits, are an essential part of the international systems of 
human rights and the latter should not be seen as holistic or homogeneous.81 Any 
regional instrument must be read as furthering the interests of a superior body, such as 
the United Nations. The Charter of Organization of African Unity (OAU) now known 
as the African Union (AU), clamours for freedom, equality, justice and dignity.82  Thus, 
no African which is a signatory to the African Charter country or any similar instrument 
can justify its failure to fulfilling its human rights.83 The conclusion is that regional 
                                                 
77 Welch, Claude E. Jr. (1993) ‘Human Rights and African Women: A Comparison of Protection Under 
Two Major Treaties’ 15 Human Rights Quarterly  549 - 574 
78 Ibid at 551.            
79 Banda, F. (2003) ‘Global Standard: Local Values’17 International Journals of Law and Policy at 3. 
80 Compare with the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights of 1981 (UIDHR) ,in which all 
rights are guaranteed as provided under Sharia. 
81 Beyani, Chaloka (1994) ‘Towards a More Effective Guarantee of Women’s Rights in the African 
Human Rights System’ in Cook, R (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International 
Perspectives 285 at  288. 
82 As a regional organisation,  the AU is connected to the UN as shown in the former’s preamble. It 
pledges its allegiance to the UN Charter and the UDHR as a solid foundation for peaceful and positive 
cooperation among states. This subordinates the AU and any other body or instrument emanating from 
the region or elsewhere to the UN Charter and its instruments. See Beyani 287- 289.  
83 AU Constitutive Act 2000, preamble, articles 3(g), 3(h), 4(l) and 4(m) 
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instruments and international regimes for human rights are always expected to work in 
tandem. A contradictory or inconsistent regional law would be regarded as void to the 
extent of its inconsistency.  
 
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981) 
Disadvantaged by prevalent repugnant traditions and customs, many African women 
are treated as of lesser value compared to their male counterparts.84  Many African 
women suffer from discriminatory practices in the areas of employment, marriage and 
religion.  Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (African 
Charter) therefore prohibits all forms of discrimination, including those based on sex, 
whilst art 3 provides for equal protection before the law. The principle of non-
discrimination in the African Charter is unequivocal in its agreement with art 1 of 
CEDAW. The African Charter provides that ‘every individual shall be entitled to the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the present Charter without 
distinction of any kind such as . . . sex’. The Charter goes further to re-echo the practice 
of de facto equality found under CEDAW. Article 18(3) provides that ‘the states shall 
ensure the elimination of every85discrimination against women and also ensure the 
protection of the rights of the woman . . .’. The word ‘every’ in this provision permeates 
all aspects of discrimination and admits no exception. To guarantee a robust protection, 
this shall be done with regard to international conventions and declarations.86 Article 
60 of the African Charter allows the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights (African Commission) to draw inspiration from international law on human and 
peoples’ rights; this includes provisions of various instruments adopted within the 
specialised agencies of the United Nations, of which the parties to the present Charter 
are members. Therefore, the African Commission in Legal Resources Foundation v 
Zambia87 took into consideration the comment of the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) on art 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
                                                 
84 Ssenyonjo, Manisuli (2007) ‘Culture and the human rights of women in Africa : between light and 
shadow’ 51(1) Journal of African Law 39 – 67.  
85 Emphasis supplied. 
86 This binds the African states to international human rights standards relating to women rights 
regardless of whether they are a party or not to those particular instruments. Kois, L (1997) ‘Article 18 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Progressive Approach to Women’s Human 
Rights’ 3(1) East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 102-103. 
87 Comm No 211/98, 29th ordinary session (23 April-7 May 2001). Available from 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/211-98.html> (Accessed on 10 December 2014). 
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The African Commission adopted the definition of discrimination proposed by HRC 
which stated that the term ‘discrimination ‘implies:  
‘. . . [a]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and 
freedoms.’88 
 
From the above, the African Commission rightly concluded equality entails the 
expectation that all citizens to be treated fairly and justly within the legal system and 
be assured of equal treatment before the law and equal enjoyment of the rights available 
to all citizens. 
 
Apart from states parties having to put appropriate measures in place, the contributions 
of individuals for the protection of human rights are very vital. An individual in the 
society under article 29(7) has an obligation: 
‘. . . [t]o preserve and strengthen positive89 African cultural values in his relations with other 
members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to 
contribute to the promotion of the moral well-being of society’. 
 
No definition is offered for positive for this purpose; however it is hoped that ‘positive’ 
would be given its ordinary meaning in the light of the purpose and objective of the 
Charter. Article 29(7) can neither be a tool to bypass the non discrimination provisions 
in the Charter, and nor to disregard any of CEDAW’s provisions. Rather, in the context 
of the African Charter, art 29(7) demonstrates the commitment of the drafters to discard 
cultural or religious practices that are deemed to be retrogressive.   
 
The scope of the Charter was tested in the Attorney General of Botswana v Unity Dow 
case,90 where the validity of some provisions of the Botswana Citizenship Act of 1984 
was challenged. The Act provided that children born in wedlock acquired only the 
nationality of their father and not that of their mother. The Act also allowed a Tswana 
man to pass on his nationality to his alien wife, but denied a Tswana woman the same 
right to pass on her nationality to her alien husband. Dow, who was married to an 
American citizen, challenged these provisions, because her two children and her 
                                                 
88General Comment No. 18 (37) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1 (1989),  
reprinted in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/ Rev.1 at 26 (1994). 
89 Emphasis supplied.  
90 [1992] LRC Const. 623. 
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husband could not claim Botswana citizenship. Accordingly, she argued that this was 
discriminatory on the grounds of sex and in contravention of international human rights 
standards. The court, invoking the African Charter, rejected the defence of traditions 
and custom, and held that the challenged provisions of the Citizenship Act were 
discriminatory and violated the international standards of human rights.91  
 
Critiques of the African Charter have centred on the lacklustre performance of the 
African Commission,92 claw-back clauses,93 the choice of language94 and the provision 
of article 18.95 The latter has generated debates arising from the linking of women’s 
rights with the concepts of family, tradition and morality and with children and the 
disabled. The contention is that the lumping together of women’s rights along with 
others forms of rights will not sufficiently safeguard women’s rights.96 The arguments 
emphasise women’s rights in relation to the traditional African family in which women 
are seen as the ‘beast of family burden’.97 This perception is said to be sustained through 
the Charter’s stance which implies that the African concept of human rights should be 
inspired by the virtues of African tradition and the values of African civilization.98 
                                                 
91 See also Ephraim v Pastory and Kaizingele 87 I.L.R 106, a Tanzanian decision outlawing 
discriminatory cultural practices, under the Haya customary law that forbids a woman from disposing of 
her interest in land. 
92 Viljoen, F (2004) ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Introduction to the 
African Commission and the Regional Human Rights Systems’ in C Heyns (ed.) Human Rights Law in 
Africa vol.1 at 497 
93 Kufuor, KO (2010)The African Human Rights System: Origin and Evolution. These are clauses 
which subject the provisions of the Charter to domestic laws thus limiting the effect of such provisions.  
Some examples are Articles 6, 8 and 9. See also Nmehielle, Vincent O (2004) ‘Development of the 
African Human Rights System in the Last Decade.’ 11(3) Human Rights Brief 6 - 11 
94 Heyns, Christof  (2001) ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’  1(2)African 
Human Rights Law Journal 155 -174 
95 For general discussions on the flaws of the African Charter, see Heyns, Christof  (2001) ‘The African 
regional human rights system: In need of reform?’  1(2)African Human Rights Law Journal 155 -174 
96Elmadmad, K (1992); ‘The Rights of Women under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
in Benedek, W & Heinz,W (eds), Regional Systems of Human Rights in Africa, America and Europe: 
Proceedings of the Conference; Oloka-Onyago, J (1995) ‘Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the 
Struggle for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa’ 26 California Western International Law 
Journal 1; Odinkalu, C A (2002) ‘Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in Evans, M & Murray ,R (eds) The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000. 
97Butegwa, Florence (1994) “‘Using the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights to Secure 
Women's Access to Land in Africa,"’ in Cook, Rebecca (ed)Human Rights of Women: National and 
International Perspectives 495  
98 Beyani, Chaloka (1994) ‘Towards a More Effective Guarantee of Women’s Rights in the African 
Human Rights System’ in Cook, R (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International 
Perspectives 291-292. 
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Mutua argues that these fears are unfounded and give the Charter a negative image.99 
In fact art 18 has comprehensive provisions covering various classes of rights. In 
agreement with Mutua, it is submitted that such an interpretation betrays a lack of 
awareness of the African family system and the position which women occupy in 
African society. Furthermore, women are highly placed within the family system; they 
are not just equal but embody a cardinal personality in the sustenance of human life.100 
Besides, African culture has never been stagnant; it has grown and changed in response 
to contemporary developments. This would be expected to continue, although a 
problem could be the speed at which it responds and adapts, a continuous acculturation 
process may guarantee a smoother transformation. 
 
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa 
To remedy the visible weaknesses of the African Charter, Protocol (the Protocol)101 was 
adopted on 11 July 2003 at the African Union (AU) meeting in Maputo, Mozambique 
and came into force on 25 November 2005.102 Twenty-eight countries had ratified the 
Protocol by 18 February 2013, the latest being Guinea Bissau. Egypt, Tunisia and 
Botswana are key countries which have neither signed nor ratified the Protocol.103 The 
existence of a specific treaty on women’s right has the benefit of underlining the issues 
which negatively impact upon women and forces states parties to adopt a more 
gendered interpretation of rights so that human rights can really begin to be seen as 
women’s rights. The Protocol represents the greater visibility and the newly acquired 
strength of women’s organisations in Africa.104  
                                                 
99Mutua, Makau ‘The African Human Rights System : A Critical Evaluation’ Available from 
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/mutua.pdf> (accessed on 23 February 2014). 
100 Ibid. 
101 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,  ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights’ and the ‘Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples  Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa’. Available at <http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/women-
protocol/achpr_instr_proto_women_eng.pdf> (accessed on 18 February 2013).  
102 See Evans, M & Murray ,R (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: The System in 
Practice, 1986-2000 303; Karugonjo-Segawa, Roselyn (2005) “The Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women”  
103 For a list of countries which have signed and ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa see <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-
protocol/ratification/>  (accessed on 10 September 2013) 
104 Viljoen Frans  (2009) ‘An Introduction to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa  16(1) Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice 11 
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The preamble launches the Protocol into normative recognition by building on art 66 
of the African Charter. It reaffirms the principle of promoting gender equality as 
stipulated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union105 and laments the continued 
existence of female gender discrimination and cultural practices which are harmful to 
women. The Protocol contains some unique provisions, such as the right to peace;106 
protection of women in armed conflicts;107 widows’ rights;108 the right to inheritance; 
special protection of elderly women;109 special protection of women with disabilities;110 
and special protection of women in distress.111 There are also substantive provisions on 
reproductive rights and the rights to abortion.112 Banda describes the Protocol as 
‘uncompromisingly pro-woman and anti-defence of discriminatory cultural 
practices’.113 
 
The definitional article, art 1, contains vital terms that are meant to address the 
shortcomings of the African Charter. Its comprehensiveness goes beyond the scope of 
CEDAW. Article 1 defines discrimination against women:                   
‘as any distinction, exclusion or restriction or any differential treatment based on sex and whose 
objectives or effects compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or the  
exercise by women or regardless of their marital status, of human rights and fundamental  
             freedom in all sphere of life’. 
 
This definition of discrimination represents an improvement over CEDAW’s definition. 
The phrase ‘any differential treatment’ targets imbalances, such as those found under 
Islamic law regarding the status and rights of women in marriage and the family.114 The 
enjoyment of equal rights ‘regardless of marital status’ establishes further that the 
Protocol is not in conflict with CEDAW, knowing full well that in many African 
                                                 
105 Art 4(l) AU Constitutive Act available  from 
<http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf> 
106 The Protocol art 10. 
107 Art11. 
108 Art 20. 
109 Art 21. 
110 Art 22. 
111 Art 23. 
112 Art 24 
113 Banda, F. (2003) ‘Global Standard: Local Values’17 International Journals of Law and Policy at 18 
114 In keeping with verse 4:34 of the Qur’an, it is un-Islamic for women to hold general public office. 
In addition, while a man is entitled to divorce any of his wives at will, a wife is not entitled to a 
divorce, except by judicial order on very specific and limited grounds. And under the Islamic law of 
inheritance, women are only entitled to half of the share of men.  See Alston, Philip & Goodman, Ryan 
(2012) International Human Rights in Context: Text and Materials 550. 
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societies unmarried and divorced women are treated with disdain. This definition uses 
the phrase ‘in all spheres of life’ instead of the specific listings of CEDAW to allow for 
an interpretation that encompasses all areas of discrimination. Article 1 also defines 
harmful practices as ‘… all behaviours, attitudes and/or practices which negatively 
affect the fundamental rights of women and girls such as their right to life, health 
dignity, education and physical integrity’. The aim is to use law to correct the attitude 
of the people; this is a task to be done incrementally. Harmful practices encompass, 
inter alia, female genital mutilation and widowhood rites. Drafted to reflect recent 
happenings on the African continent, the definition of violence against women 
encapsulates inchoate acts of violence. It covers:                         
                ‘[A]ll acts perpetrated against women, which cause or could cause them physical, sexual              
                 psychological and economic harm, including the threat to take such acts: or to undertake 
                the imposition of arbitrary restriction on or deprivations of fundamental freedoms in private  
                or public life in peace time and during situation of armed conflicts or war’.115 
 
Obligations of the states parties to eliminate discrimination against women will be 
fulfilled through the enactment of appropriate legislative, institutional and other 
measures.116 They are to include in their national constitutions and other legislative 
instruments the principle of equality between women and men and ensure its 
application.117  States parties must take corrective and positive action in those areas 
where discrimination against women in law and in fact continues to exist.118 Article 
2(2) of the Protocol resonates with CEDAW’s article 5: the states parties commit to 
modifying the social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men through public 
education, information, education and communication, with the aim of eliminating 
harmful cultural and traditional practices 
 
The Protocol provides that every woman shall have the right to dignity as a human 
being and recognises her human and legal rights.119 It adds that states parties shall adopt 
and implement appropriate measures to prohibit any exploitation or degradation of 
women.120 This provision aims to forestall humiliating practices such as widowhood 
rites, forced labour and forced marriage. This is amplified in the succeeding article, 
                                                 
115 Protocol, art1(j) 
116Art 2 
117 Art 2(i) a. 
118 ibid art 2(1)d 
119 Art 3( 1). 
120 Art 3(3). 
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which commits states parties to guarantee the right to life, and the integrity and security 
of the person of women by prohibiting all forms of exploitation, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment or treatment.121 States parties are bound to take appropriate and 
effective measures to actively promote peace education through curricula and social 
communication in order to eradicate elements in traditional and cultural beliefs, 
practices and stereotypes that legitimise and exacerbate the persistence of violence 
against women.122   
 
The Protocol goes to the root of stereotypes in family law. The onus of ensuring that 
women and men enjoy equal rights and are regarded as equal partners in marriage is 
placed on the states parties.123 Forced marriages are forbidden124 and a minimum age 
for marriage is specified.125 Article 6(d) forms an alliance with art 16(2) of CEDAW 
and makes legal validity of marriage subject to registration.126 It approves and adopts 
the Unity Dow case127 and allows a woman not only to retain her nationality, or to 
acquire the nationality of her husband, but also to pass the same to her children, except 
in cases of threat to national security interests.128 The revolutionary tone of CEDAW 
became distinct in the drafting of the Protocol which provided that:                      polygamy 
shall be prohibited except when consented to by both parties; and in any country where 
polygamy still exists, the law shall strive to work towards its elimination.129 
 
Most legal systems in Africa support polygamy because, which is entrenched in many 
customary and religious systems. The usefulness of cross-cultural dialogue becomes 
apparent here. In its final form, the Protocol reads: ‘…monogamy is encouraged as the 
preferred form of marriage…’.130 This cautious approach of the Protocol has been 
regarded not just as a compromise, but also as an act of legal cowardice.131 However 
the Protocol gives women locked in such relationships the consolation that ‘...the rights 
                                                 
121 Art 4(1). 
122 Art 4(2)(d). 
123 Art 6(1). 
124Art (6)(a). 
125 Art 6(b).  
126 Art 6(d). 
127 Attorney General of Botswana v Unity Dow [1992]LRC Const. 623. 
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of women in marriage and family, including in polygamous marital relationship are 
promoted and protected’.132  
 
Regarding separation, divorce and annulment of marriage, the Protocol provides that 
men and women enjoy the same rights and divorce must be by a judicial order; a 
reiteration of CEDAW’s stance.133  The Protocol adds that both men and women have 
the same rights and responsibilities towards their children when seeking separation, 
divorce or annulment of marriage.134 Furthermore, both women and men are given 
equal rights in sharing any joint property deriving from the marriage.135 Finally, on 
family issues, the Protocol goes further than CEDAW in that it incorporates dealing 
with the rights of widows to be free from inhumane, humiliating and degrading 
treatment; the rights to retain the guardianship of their children; to remarry if they wish 
and the rights to inherit their husband’s property136 and to continue living in their 
matrimonial home.137  
 
Like the African Charter, the Protocol shies away from the problem of reservations. 
This may either mean there is no reservation or that reservation is possible. The Protocol 
should have been clearer in forbidding reservations, in order to avoid the problems 
created by CEDAW. Similarly, provisions that allow states to derogate from the rights 
provided during times of war, public danger or other emergency are lacking in the 
Additional Protocol. This suggests that there is no instance when a state can derogate 
from the rights guaranteed in the instrument.   
 
Sub-regional human rights instruments 
The instruments considered in this part of the article fall under Kufour’s categorisation, 
namely those sub-regional economic instruments that do not relate directly to human 
rights. Poverty is a common threat and one of the sources of human rights violations in 
                                                 
132 Viljoen, F (2004) ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Introduction to the 
African Commission and the Regional Human Rights Systems’ in C Heyns (ed.) Human Rights Law in 
Africa vol.1 
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Africa. As Viljoen explains, ‘the heart of sub-regional integration would beat in vain if 
it did not provide a lifeline to those living in poverty’.138 Thus, economic integration 
only makes sense when it guarantees the socio-economic rights of citizens.   
 
Both the Union Econmique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also address the socio-economics 
rights of women and the need to liberate women from discrimination. UEMOA 
recognises the particular role of women in the social and economic development of the 
region. Apart from identifying the inferior status of women in African society, UEMOA 
recommends that states parties should commit themselves to a timetabled plan of action 
broadly covering social health, education and the economic constraints facing women. 
It encourages states to take temporary measures to improve the access of girls to 
educational establishments including those at higher and education technical levels. 
Member states are categorically enjoined to ratify CEDAW and its Protocol where they 
have not.139 The revised ECOWAS Treaty recognises the promotion and protection of 
human rights as stipulated in the African Charter. In ECOWAS’s Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance, member states are obliged to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination and harmful and degrading practices against women. States Parties are 
to put in place the necessary structures to ensure that women’s, youths’ and children’s 
education is enabled.140  
 
Since its priority is to establish a free trade area, the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa 141(COMESA) does not address human rights in detail. Article 6(e) of 
the Treaty recognises the promotion and protection of human and people’s rights in 
accordance with the provisions of the African Charter. Though couched in commercial 
language, the role of women in development and business is recognised. Women play 
a vital role in economic transformation and sustainable growth. It is imperative to 
involve them in the implementation of programmes for rural areas and improvements 
                                                 
138 Viljoen, Frans 2ed (2012) International Human Rights Law in Africa 481. 
139<http://www.izf.net/isf/Documentation/JournalOfficiel/Afriqueouest/de99/Rec_03_99.html> 
(accessed on 21 May  2014). 
140 Protocol to the ECOWAS Treaty on Democracy and Good Governance. Protocol A/SPI/12/01 arts 
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in the informal sector.142 Examining the position of women and their right to own land, 
Päivi Koskinen argues that economic rights guarantee political rights and these rights 
eventually lead to other human rights, such as the right to health and the right to food.143 
Therefore, member states should eliminate discriminatory regulatory frameworks and 
customs which prevent women from owning land and other assets.   
 
Customary land law systems across Africa do not favour women; many women own 
property only at the pleasure of their husbands. Art 154 of the COMESA Treaty attacks 
the root of this culture. The integration of women into economic decision-making 
requires the acquisition of the necessary skills, education and capacity development. 
Necessary changes must be implemented in educational and training strategies to 
include the needs of women.144  COMESA Treaty145 is premised upon ‘adherence to 
universally acceptable principles of good governance . . . observance of human rights 
and social justice’. Articles 121(a)-(b) in agreement with the previously agrees with the 
earlier discussed arts 2(f) and 5 of CEDAW that member states should abolish 
legislation and discourage customs that are discriminatory against women. In addition, 
member states should take other measures in order to eliminate prejudices against 
women and promote the equality of the female gender in relation to that of men in every 
aspect of life.146  
 
The Declaration on Gender and Development (1997)147 and the Addendum to the 
SADC Declaration on Gender and Development, namely the prevention and 
Eradication of Violence Against Women and Children (1998)148 by the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC)149 both proscribe discrimination on the 
basis of sex. The 1997 Declaration, in agreement with CEDAW, calls for ‘repealing 
and reforming all laws, amending constitutions and changing social practices which 
                                                 
142 See the Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa art 154  
143 Ibid.  
144 Ibid art 155 
145 Treaty establishing The East African Community 1999 reproduced in Heyns, C (ed) Human Rights 
Law in Africa vol 1at 634-639 
146 Ibid.  
147< http://www.sadc.int/files/7613/5292/8380/Declaration_on_Gender__Development_1997.pdf>  
148 <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/eradication-violence-woman-sadc-addendium/> 
149 A Southern African regional body of 14 members nations. 
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will subject women to discrimination, and enacting gender sensitive laws’.150 It 
advocates women empowerment through access to and control over resources. The 
Addendum complements the 1997 Declaration by focusing on violence against woman 
in both the private and public spheres. The types of violence covered include ‘economic 
deprivation, marital rape, femicide, female genital mutilation, trafficking in women and 
children, forced prostitution, sexual harassment and intimidation’.151   In North Africa, 
the document which established the Arab Maghreb Union does not address human 
rights.152 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
This article has looked at the interplay between African culture and the formulation of 
women’s rights in Africa. In the context of the debate between universalism versus 
relativism with regards to human rights, the article has attempted to explore whether 
African regional human rights can rightly be circumscribed within wider international 
human rights legislation in relations to women’s rights. Undoubtedly, the universalism-
relativism debate will continue to be part of human right discourse. This debate will 
never be static and will continue to evolve in response to various political developments 
and undertones, which are dictated by the necessity for people to interact with and 
tolerate one another. When universality of human rights are conceived without regards 
to the cultural beliefs and participation of a particular region or state, such universality 
will not be acknowledged by states that feel that their opinions have been disregarded. 
On the other hand, an excessive focus on relativism could lead to denial or violation of 
rights individuals or minority groups. States must therefore continue to seek a 
converging point through cross-cultural dialogue.  
 
                                                 
150 <http://www.sadc.int/files/7613/5292/8380/Declaration_on_Gender__Development_1997.pdf> para. 
H(iv) 
151 The Prevention and Eradication of Violence Against Women and Children (1998) Available from 
<http://www.achpr.org/instruments/eradication-violence-woman-sadc-addendium/> (accessed on 15 
March 2015). 
152 See the Treaty Establishing the Arab Maghreb Union available at 
<http://www.maghrebarabe.org/en/conventions.cfm?type=1>  (accessed on 15 March 2013). The aim of 
AMU is to ensure regional stability and enhanced political coordination among member states. Members 
are Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.  
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This article has also highlighted the capabilities of the normative frameworks of a 
number of African regional human rights instruments in the protection of women’s 
rights. The article accentuates the challenges of these instruments to be accepted on the 
wider international stage and also reflecting the collective regional identity and protect 
cultural integrity within a framework of promoting human rights.  
 
To an appreciable extent, CEDAW has set a standard which surpasses its predecessors 
in protecting women’s rights on an international level. CEDAW adopts a holistic 
approach by focussing on discrimination against women, emphasising that women have 
suffered, and continue to suffer from various forms of discrimination because they are 
women. CEDAW imposes a legal obligation on states parties to protect, respect and 
promote the rights to non-discrimination and to ensure the development and 
advancement of women in order to improve their position to one of de jure, as well as 
de facto, equality with men.  Impressively, all but two African states, namely Sudan 
and Somalia, have ratified CEDAW. In the context of CEDAW, African regional 
human rights instruments do not retreat from the concept of the universality of human 
rights; instead there is a concomitant rejection of relativism and this enriches the human 
right corpus on the continent of Africa. These instruments decry all forms of 
discrimination against women and advocate concrete agendas for women emancipation. 
The influence of CEDAW on the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa cannot be overstated. 
The Protocol is blunt in its eradication of cultural stereotypes; customs and traditions, 
which can only be respected where they do not infringe on the rights of African women 
in any guise. Without doubt, there is a clear cut convergence between the approach of 
CEDAW and African human rights systems with regards to women’s rights.  
 
It is trite that the normative recognition of (women’s) rights does not always mean that 
the intended beneficiaries actually get to enjoy their rights. This doubt is compounded 
by the politics of multicultural and multi-ethnic societies can act as a ‘yoke’ on African 
human rights system. Cultural practices are deeply entrenched and most states are still 
reluctant or are ‘dragging their feet ‘in adopting the appropriate measures required at 
both regional and international levels.  It is through genuine commitment, which can be 
assessed through law making, judicial decisions and policy executions, that required 
changes can be effected. There is a need to interpret these instruments as living 
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instruments. Legislative bodies must purposely work towards aligning their laws with 
regional and international laws while judicial authorities, in good faith, take note of 
human rights decisions in other countries in promoting women’s rights in their courts.   
In addition, since most women’s rights violations happen in the private sphere, the 
usefulness of continuous education comes to the fore. Education becomes a vital tool 
in changing the orientation of both the ‘preys’ and the ‘predators’. Some perpetrators 
do not conceive their acts to be a violation of human rights, while their ‘victims’ regard 
the status quo as acceptable. Public education and public participation in human rights 
create the space for intra-community dialogue. 
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